When Ukrainians can become a political force in Poland and what that could change
With more than a month left before Poland’s presidential election, the campaign’s main topics are security, migration, and Ukraine.
While security and migration are standard themes for right-wing politicians, the presidential candidates’ debates have shown at least some constructive discussion on these issues. In contrast, the rhetoric surrounding Ukraine and Ukrainians has leaned heavily toward populism and the stirring of negative emotions.
Read more aboyt why do Polish politicians consistently portray Ukraine and Ukrainians in a negative light and why might this change soon in the column by Olena Babakova, a journalist from Warsaw – Why Polish politicians will soon have to soften their anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.
The author notes that during the election campaign, Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland are systematically portrayed in a negative light.
"The behaviour of politicians is easy to explain by public sentiment: while Poles still support military aid to the Ukrainian state, assistance to refugees no longer resonates with more than half of society," observes Olena Babakova.
According to the journalist, many Poles believe that Ukraine should agree to peace, even if it means territorial concessions to Russia. Voters are tired of the war and convinced that too much has been spent on it.
However, the columnist also draws attention to another important point: Polish politicians don’t care much about the opinion of Ukrainians because Ukrainians don’t vote for them. Ukrainian migrants still rarely become Polish citizens. And this trend isn’t unique to Ukrainians.
According to her data, Poland's naturalisation rate (the ratio of migrants who received citizenship to the total number of foreign residents with visas and residence permits issued for over six months) is lower than the EU average – 1.7% compared to 2.2%.
But this situation of ignoring Ukrainian voices during campaigns could change in just a few years, Babakova argues.
She emphasises that over time, Ukrainians are becoming better integrated into Polish society, learning the language, and simply residing in Poland for the necessary number of years.
In 2015, only 2,000 Ukrainian migrants received a Polish passport. By 2023, that number had risen to around 5,600, and the journalist predicts it will be even higher in 2024.
Between 2021 and 2024, 39,100 Ukrainians received long-term EU resident status in Poland (meaning they had lived in Poland for five or more years). Babakova suggests that most of them will continue living in the country and will eventually want to apply for Polish citizenship. She believes the same applies to the more than 23,000 individuals of Ukrainian origin who received permanent residence permits in 2023–2024.
Interestingly, the journalist also points out that some Ukrainians who have lived abroad for a long time, but had not previously considered Polish citizenship due to Ukraine’s ban on dual citizenship, may now change their minds.
She argues that a potential gamechanger could be the new "Multiple Citizenship" law, a draft of which was adopted by Ukraine’s parliament in December 2024. The bill has passed its first reading and is currently being revised. It would allow Ukrainians to hold multiple citizenships, specifically if acquired in "friendly" countries, primarily EU and NATO member states.
Such naturalisation prospects could be a gamechanger for Polish politicians.
"For example, to get into the Sejm from a low position on the list of a major party like PiS or the Civic Coalition, it’s enough to receive 10,000 to 15,000 votes," the journalist notes.